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COLORADO: A STUDY IN FRONTIER SOVEREIGNTY
By ROBERT L. STEARNS*
OLORADO was until recently our last frontier. This
community was described by Major Stephen H. Long
in 1820 as "the great American desert" and by Daniel
Webster in 1838 as "a vast and worthless area-a region of
savages and wild beasts, of deserts, shifting sands and whirlwinds of dust, of cactus and prairie dogs." It has a unique
and fascinating history-a history with which many of you
are no doubt familiar, but which to some may still be novel.
At any rate, the chronicle of the life of a courageous, self-reliant people should prove of particular interest to any and all of
us in this day, when we are prone to regard government as a
chisel, instead of as a hoe.
Long before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock or
John Smith and his party at Jamestown, that area we now
know as Colorado had been claimed by right of conquest and
discovery by Francesco Vasques Coronado for his Most Christian Majesty Charles I of Spain. True, it had not been settled
or colonized, but it was known about and claimed. But
claimed from whom? From its aboriginal occupants who had
ranged its plains and hunted in its mountain parks from a time
whereof the memory of man, civilized or savage, runneth not
to the contrary. But Coronado and his band sought the Seven
Cities of Cibola, the untold wealth of mythical Quivira. Instead of fabulous wealth, he found only a prairie ranged with
hordes of "hump-back oxen"--the American Bison-and
what is now known as Kansas, and returned to Mexico, a
weary and disillusioned man.
The apparent failure of his expedition dampened the
ardor of other venturesome souls, and the Indians continued
to hunt the humped-backed oxen and remained secure in their
plains and mountains for another 166 years. In 1706 Juan
de Uribarri, a military emissary from the Governor of Mexico,
came northeast from Taos, New Mexico, to the vicinity of
Pueblo on the Arkansas River, and there, with formal ceremony claimed the land for Philip V of Spain. No doubt of
our Spanish heritage can exist if you look at the map of Colo*Dean of the School of Law, University of Colorado. This paper was read as an
address to the thirtieth annual meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries at
Denver. Reprint from Rocky Mountain Law Review, June. 1936.
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rado. The names of numerous mountains and rivers and
seventeen counties are of Spanish origin.
But Colorado was not without rivals for its affections
and favors. The eastern part of the state was claimed by
France and sold to the United States in the Louisiana Purchase
in 1803. The state as now known was thereafter divided
between the territories of Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska and
Utah. Then followed a series of claims and counterclaims
for control of the region, aggravated by the national issue of
whether or not the new area should be slave or free-an almost
ironical concept in a community where men were politically
free almost to the point of abandonment, but were enslaved to
the most relentless of taskmasters, economic necessity.
Such then was the Rocky Mountain region in 1858-an
area inhabited by Indians and trappers and by a handful of
disappointed gold seekers straggling back from Californiaan area under the nominal political control of four territorial
sovereignties and under the actual governance of none-a
bleak mountain and prairie region-a stepchild of four neglectful parents and the ward of a Federal Government already
engaged in the birth throes of the deliverance of a nation.
But something happened in 1858-something more significant to this area than the Lincoln-Douglas debates or the
Dred Scott decision. A group of gold seekers heading for
California led by William Green Russell were lured by rumors
of the Pike's Peak region and discovered gold in the barren
channel of Dry Creek. George A. Jackson, an amazingly selfreliant man, thawed out the December ice in Chicago Creek
near Idaho Springs and panned, according to his own diary,
"eight treaty cups of colors." The next spring John Gregory,
"a lazy fellow from Gordon County, Georgia," panned an
almost unheard of quantity of gold in one of the tributaries of
Clear Creek near what is now Black Hawk. The news of
these discoveries spread like wildfire, and within the next 12
months 30,000 people came to Colorado.
Now my narrative has not to do with the romance of
these discoveries nor with a description of the covered wagons,
handcarts and wheel-barrows in which these people moved
their worldly goods, but with the most interesting picture of
their governance and control. The particular region which
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they inhabited was partly Kansas, partly Utah, partly New
Mexico and partly Nebraska territories. The inhabitants
were free-born Americans from Missouri, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky and wherever not.
After the first fever of discovery was over and the novelty of the situation had worn off, they began to realize that
they were a strange and miscellaneous people in a vast and
inhospitable land. Here then begins my narrative-a story
as old as the Anglo-Saxon race-a story of self-government
and the recognition of self-imposed sovereign authority.
Early in the spring of 1859, the urge of government was
upon these settlers. In the first issue of the Rocky Mountain
News, dated April 23, 1859, a record of a public meeting
appears, describing a gathering on the eleventh of that month,
at which meeting it was unanimously resolved "that the different precincts be requested to appoint delegates to meet in
convention on the 15th inst. to take into consideration the
propriety of organizing a new state or territory."
On the night before this convention a meeting of the citizens of Auraria (later to be called Denver in honor of the then
Governor of Kansas Territory, Brigadier General James W.
Denver) appointed delegates to this convention and then proceeded to instruct their delegates as follows:
"Resolved that the delegates be instructed to act in the convention
with a view to forming a State government, and that they should let
no sectional influences sway them in their deliberations."

The convention met April 15th, according to call, in
Wooton's Hall, which was the upper floor of Dick Wooton's
store. A committee of credentials was appointed to examine
and approve the credentials of the duly accredited delegates.
The sentiment of the meeting was practically unanimous for
the immediate organization of a new state from parts of Kansas, Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico territories, without
waiting for the expiration of the usual preliminary territorial
period.
In the call for this meeting the temper of the people, and
an expression of their purpose, appeared:
"Government of some kind we must have, and the question narrows itself down to this point: Shall it be government of the knife and
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revolver, or shall we unite in forming here in our golden country, among
the ravines and gulches of the Rocky Mountains, and the fertile valleys
of the Arkansas and Plattes, a new and independent state? * * * Let
us all unite as one in so great an object. * * * It is a glorious cause,
and a feeling of pride as well as of duty would lead us to act in it."

The meeting was seriously devoted to consideration of
those factors that made statehood necessary, with particular
emphasis upon the remoteness of organized efficient civil authority. ' In order to prevent the discussion from wandering
too far afield, the following resolution was adopted:
"RESOLVED, that the discussions of this convention shall have
but one object, viz.: the formation of a new and independent State of

the Union."

Does this sound like the action of a disorganized group
of ignorant immigrants? Is this the picture that the average
Easterner has of the conduct of the bearded men in the wild
and wooly West? These men were not playing at government. To them it was real and vital. By resolution they
defined the boundaries of the proposed new state to include
the area that is now Colorado and added thereto a generous
slice of Wyoming and Utah and then they resolved "that the
name thereof shall be the State of Jefferson."
The meeting had provided for a constitutional convention comprised of delegates to be chosen directly by the people
to draft a constitution and make arrangements for the furtherance of the state movement. They fixed the second Monday
in May as the time for holding selection of delegates and the
first Monday in June as the date of the constitutional convention.
The election of delegates was rather perfunctory, but
they were held in most localities and the convention assembled
on June 6th with due solemnity. By this time the news of
the Jackson and Gregory discoveries had become known and
the entire community was in an uproar. Fifty delegates representing 13 precincts convened and the convention proceedings
were formally opened with a prayer by a pioneer Methodist
clergyman, the Reverend G. W. Fisher. Committees were appointed to perfect the organization. On the next day it was
decided that the convention should adjourn until the first
Monday in August, in order that additional delegates be
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elected and that the people of the region be more fully represented.
Between that meeting and the adjournment thereof to
the first of August considerable opposition arose to the state
organization plan, due chiefly to the expense such a form of
government would entail. It was urged by the opposition
that a territory would be better than a state, because most of
the expense of territorial organization and maintenance would
fall upon the Federal Government.
When the convention reconvened on August first there
were 164 delegates representing 46 precincts. This convention was marked by the same degree of solemnity and earnestness of purpose that characterized the earlier meeting. It went
through the usual formalities of organization, approval of
credentials of delegates, and appointments of committees to
handle the details of the convention's business. The problem,
of course, was a peculiar one, and in a certain sense the meeting
itself was a mild rebellion against the type of political organization then existing.
Before the convention adjourned the following resolution was adopted:
"RESOLVED, That the convention now proceed to prepare a
Constitution for the State of Jefferson; and also that the Convention
appoint a committee of 13, whose duty it shall be to prepare a memorial
to Congress, asking the immediate organization of a Territorial Government for the Territory of Jefferson; and that said Constitution and
Memorial both be submitted to the, voters within the limits of the State
-Territory, on the first Monday of September next for their approval

or rejection."

The memorial was prepared and the Constitution which
had been under consideration.for some time was drafted, and
the organic law of the proposed new commonwealth was thus
made ready to submit to the vote of the people. Ballots were
prepared in alternate forms to be used at the forthcoming election: those reading "For Constitution" providing that they
should "be considered a full and complete negative to a Territorial organization"; and those reading "For Territory"
providing that they should "be considered a full and complete
negative to a State Constitution."
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Thus the aim of the convention was to sound out the
public sentiment on the question of statehood or territoriality,
and take whatever action was supported by the popular will.
It was clearly, however, not its intention to abrogate all ties
with the existing order. An effort was made to straddle the
problem as evidenced by the fact that the delegates decided, if
statehood should be defeated at the polls, in September,
another election would be held one month thereafter on the
first Monday in October, for the double purpose of electing a
delegate to the Kansas Legislature and, at the same time, a
delegate to Congress to represent Jefferson Territory. This
latter representative, as subsequently chosen, was not an accredited representative, but did excellent work in impressing
Congress with the earnest desire of the people in the Rocky
Mountain region to have a separate political organization
carved from the existing four-headed government. At this
election, also, it was planned to choose a full complement of
state officers. After completing the details of the forthcoming
plebiscite, the convention adjourned to abide the outcome of
the popular will upon its efforts. Thus, a foundation for a
new commonwealth was laid within less than a year from the
day that George Jackson panned his "treaty cups" of colors
from the ice-bound creek bed of Chicago Creek.
When the popular election was held on the 6th of September, 1859, the result was a serious blow to the friends and
advocates of statehood. The apathy of the electorate was just
as pronounced then as now. The total vote of the region was
but 2,650 votes, divided 2,007 for a territory and 649 for a
state. In the mining camps the vote was very light. Statewide political developments were of small concern to the miners. In some of the mountain precincts no vote was taken at
all. No doubt the light vote can be accounted for in part by
the fact that of the thousands that came to Colorado in the
spring and summer of 1859, a great many had gone back to
the States, disillusioned and disgusted. The proponents of
the statehood plan, who were the more substantial citizens,
were disturbed by serious misgivings, occasioned by the continuation of an unorganized community with its attendant
evils.
However, since the voters had expressed their preference
quite overwhelmingly for a territorial form of government,
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the next step was to carry out the popular will. Although
the region was still a part of the four territories above named,
and so created by acts of Congress, the great mass of the people
became quite enthusiastic for an independent territory with a
separate group of officers of their own selection. They stimulated their enthusiasm with a strained construction of the
Kansas organic act. That act provided that all territory to
which the Indian title had not been extinguished should not
be regarded as being within Kansas Territory until the occupant tribes should voluntarily consent to have their lands
placed under Kansas jurisdiction. Since this had not been
done, said the Colorado settlers, all Kansas courts of criminal
jurisdiction and courts of appeal were barred from this region.
Hence the area of Western Kansas was without the ordinary
processes of government. These arguments were convincing
to willing ears.
Accordingly, the elections were held on October 3, 1859,
and the provisional government convention was held the following week in Apollo Hall in Denver City. In the three-day
session the delegates prepared and adopted the territorial constitution, retaining and confirming the name of Jefferson, and
defining the boundaries of the territory exactly as they had
been for the state.
The intent and purpose of the founders of this new body
politic is best expressed in the opening paragraph of the Preamble of the new territorial Constitution. "We, the people
of the old region of the Rocky Mountains, grateful to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe for His blessings, and feeling
our dependence upon Him for the continuance of the same, do
ordain and establish a free and independent government, to
continue until such time as the Congress of the United States
shall provide a government for us."
The organization, however, did not go through without
protest. H. P. A. Smith, one of the vice-presidents of the convention, objected to the organization of the provisional government upon the following very sound legalistic grounds:
"1.
We now have all the laws that exist in Eastern Kansas
adopted under the Constitution of the United States.
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2. We have no legal right to form such a government.
3. This is not called for by the People, nor is it necessary or
proper.
4. It will abrogate all legal rights, and throw the country upon
the results of a gigantic Vigilance Committee.
5. Before such government can be formed we shall have a proper
and legal government from Congress.
6. We have elected a Delegate to Congress, asking for a Territorial form of government, and repudiating at the same time the laws of
the United States."

But in spite of Mr. Smith's objections the convention
proceeded with its work, and before adjournment nominated
an entire ticket of candidates for the territorial offices. A rival
ticket was prepared and at the popular election on October 24,
the Constitution was ratified by an almost unanimous vote,
and the convention slate was elected to office with Robert W.
Steele as "Governor" of Jefferson Territory.
From a purely technical and legalistic standpoint the
organization may have been irregular, but it was born of the
necessities of man for protection against disorganization and
its consequences. While it may have been mildly rebellious,
it was not, in any sense, treasonable.
The Jefferson legislature met in Denver on November 7,
in its first session, and became formally organized. It received
the "Governor's" initial message, and proceeded to its business. The business of this unique legislative assembly was to
perfect the territorial organization and political structure thus
far developed. The work was well conceived and, considering
the time and circumstance, was thoroughly executed. The
assembly first adopted a civil and a criminal code, each of
which were approved by the "Governor" January 25, 1860.
The criminal code consists of 487 sections, and constitutes a
complete manual of substantive criminal law and of procedure. The civil code consists of 645 sections and covers all
essential requirements of civil rights, including corporate organization and management, and the administration of decedents' estates. When viewed in the light of our present-day
legislative prolixity it is a model of conciseness. Appended
to these two codes is the certificate of the Commissioners appointed to codify the laws, which certificate reads as follows:
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"We, the Commissioners appointed to prepare a code of criminal
and civil law for the territory of Jefferson, do hereby certify the foregoing to be a code of criminal and civil law prepared by us from the Code
of Iowa, as specified by the first General Assembly of the Provisional
Government in an act passed for that purpose."

In addition to these codes the territorial legislature passed
various general and special acts. The general acts defined the
duties of the territorial officers, established a judicial system,
provided for revenue, elections, roads, incorporations of
towns, etc. They also gave legality to the decisions of the
miners' and people's courts, unique institutions, the details of
whose operations James Grafton Rogers has so ably discussed.1 The special acts largely consisted of the granting of
charters to essential industries which were being incorporated.
Perhaps the most important special act was the consolidation
of the Cherry Creek towns into one municipality under the
title of "City of Denver, Auraria and Highlands." This was
indeed a development because hitherto these communities had
been deadly rivals for the favors of the incoming settlers.
This consolidation, while not the final act in the establishment
of Denver as a single municipality, nevertheless was the beginning of a realization on the part of the residents that there was
no occasion for competitive existence.
The last act of the first General Assembly was a joint
resolution adopting a territorial seal. This may seem historically unimportant, but it is symbolically significant. The
seal was to be two inches in diameter, with a design and inscription as follows:
"The Rocky Mountains to appear in the distance, at their base the

foot plains reaching and covering the foreground of the same, on which
an emigrant wagon is to be shown with emigrants carrying mining tools;
with an inscription around the edge of the same (surrounding the above
engraving) 'The Great Seal of the Territory of Jefferson,' and in the
upper side of said circle to appear the words 'The People are the govern-

ment.' "
From the standpoint of librarians and bibliophiles the
laws of the Territory of Jefferson present a fascinating and
very valuable volume. They were published in one volume
'The Mining District Governments of the West: Their Interest and Literature
(1935) 28 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS AND THE LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL 247;
and also a pamphlet, Proceedings and Papers of the 38th Annual Convention of the
National Au'n of State Libraries (1934-35). p. 58.
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of some 303 pages, printed in Omaha, Nebraska Territory, in
1860 by Robertson & Clark, Printers. It is a very rare and
valuable book. There are four copies definitely known to be
in existence. One is in the public library in Denver, one in the
Colorado State Museum, one in the library at the University
of Nebraska at Lincoln, and one in the law library of Harvard
University. There is said to be a copy in California, but I do
not know definitely of its existence. I have heard of a sixth
copy having been listed in a book catalog within the past few
years, bearing the list price of $3,000. There are photostatic
copies of this volume in the libraries of the University of Colorado and the State Supreme Court.
Another rare and valuable Jeffersonian document is an
eight-page pamphlet comprising the standing rules for the
House of Representatives of Jefferson Territory. This was
published in Denver in 1859, and the only known copy is in
the library of the Colorado Historical Society.
Thus the new sul generis political entity started out with
all the necessary statutory equipment, but soon found a serious
problem in the enforcement of these laws by "authority-lacking executive officers" against those who appeared unwilling
to abide by them. A poll tax of $1.00 was imposed as a revenue measure, but the collection of it was quite another matter.
A judicial system was established but the miners preferred the
brief and preemptory justice of their own courts, which they
continued to maintain. The sanctity of the law depends upon
the legitimacy of its source, and as the months rolled on people
saw the shadow of the bar sinister across the shield of the new
territorial government.
In spite of that fact, "Governor" Steele and the other officers continued to discharge their duties. The population was
steadily growing. By the autumn of 1860 a casual census
showed the population of the territory at 48,000 people.
As a result of the election on October 22, 1860, "Governor" Steele and several of his associates were returned to office.
By that time there was a well developed and outright opposition to the provisional government, and the vote polled by the
successful "Governor" was relatively very small. The second
general assembly met in Denver on November 12, but the interest in its activities was overshadowed by the startling news
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of threatened secession of the Southern States. Nevertheless,
the legislature continued to sit in Denver until November 27,
when it moved to Golden City, having been seduced by the
offer of board "at $6.00 a week-wood, lights and hall rent
free." The remainder of the 40-day session continued under
these munificent conditions with barely a quorum of legislators in attendance, and upon the expiration of that period it
adjourned quite literally "without day."
But Governor Steele was no quitter. He kept at his post
and discharged such duties as devolved upon him for so long
as his territorial ship remained afloat. On February 28, 1861,
President Buchanan signed the act of Congress creating the
Territory of Colorado. There were some who wanted to
retain the name of "Jefferson."
Other names had been suggested: General Denver had in mind "Shoshone."
Others
mentioned "Cibola"-the Spanish name for buffalo. Some
desired "Pike's Peak," citing Rhode Island as a precedent for
this type of name. Others urged that the new state be called
"Platte." The original bill called the new area "Colorado,"
but an amendment changed the name to Idaho, and a further
amendment restored the name of Colorado on the theory that
many states were named from the great rivers which originated
within their boundaries. Senator Gwin of California objected: "It is the handsomest name that could be given to any
territory or state," he said, and expressed the desire to reserve
the name for the area which later became Arizona.
After the legitimate congressional creation of the Territory of Colorado, President Lincoln was inaugurated, and
following his inauguration he designated Major William Gilpin as the first territorial governor. Major Gilpin had long
been familiar with this area. His activities in the United
States Army had brought him in frequent touch with his new
domain, and its residents. He arrived in Colorado on or about
June 6, 1861, amid great pomp and dust and circumstance.
Not until he arrived, however, did Governor Steele lay down
the reins of government. On that day the provisional "Governor" abdicated in favor of the new legitimate ruler. This he
did with a dignity and majesty becoming a conscientious executive of a free people. On that day he issued a formal procla-
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mation which is of sufficient historical and human interest to
be quoted at length.
"By virtue of the authority in me vested, I, R. W. STEELE, Governor of the Territory of Jefferson under the Provisional Government,
and in and by virtue of my election by a majority of the People of the
then called government of the People of the Mining Region, unrecognized by the General Government, at the base of the Rocky Mountains,
on the East and at the center thereof, and placing our confidence in that
'Over-ruling Providence' that has for so long a period of time, steadied
us as an American People, through so many difficulties by foes seen and
unseen, I therefore issue this my proclamation in view of the arrival of
Governor Win. Gilpin, and other officers of the United States, whom I
recognize as being duly in authority. I deem it but obligatory upon me,
by virtue of my office, to yield unto 'Caesar the things that are Caesar's'
and I hereby command and direct that all officers holding commissions
under me, especially all Judges, Justices of the Peace, &4c, shall surrender
the same and from this date shall abstain from exercising the duties of
all offices they may have held under me by virtue of said commissions,
and further I advise and recommend to all law and order loving citizens
to submit to the laws of the United States and restrain themselves from
deeds of violence which so long have made our PECULIAR POSITION
almost a bye word in the eyes of the civilized world. - Again I advise my
fellow citizens who know me 'so long and so well,' to yield obedience
to the Laws of the United States, and do it by attending to your proper
and legitimate avocations whether Agricultural or Mining.
By the Governor,
R. W. STEELE, Governor.
L. L. BOWEN, Acting Secretary of the Territory of Jefferson.
Done at Denver, this 6th day of June, A. D. 1861."

From this point forward the history of Colorado is more
or
less orthodox. The state was no longer a frontier. Our
"proper
and legitimate avocations" are no longer restricted to
agriculture and mining. One of our pleasantest occupations
is to act as host to convention groups. In so doing, however,
we are not unmindful of the observation of Macauley, that
"A people that take no pride in the noble achievements of
remote ancestors will never achieve anything worthy to be
remembered with pride by remote descendants."
We may, therefore, be pardoned if we dwell for a while
upon the struggles of the early settlers in a mountain wilderness who founded a great commonwealth upon the principle
that "the people are the government."

UNLAWFUL LAWS OF CONGRESS
The West Publishing Company recently printed a list
of laws held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Several
requests have been made that DICTA reprint the list.
1803. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch. 137.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Sept. 24, 1789, as
attempting to give to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in other
cases than those prescribed in the Constitution.
1857. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.
Declared unconstitutional the "Missouri Compromise," Act March
6, 1820, on the ground that an act which prohibited a citizen from
owning certain property in territory north of a certain line and granted
the right to others was not warranted by the Constitution.
1865. Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act March 3, 1863, granting appeals from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court.
1867. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Jan. 24, 1865, prescribing a test oath that the opponent had never voluntarily borne arms
against the United States as a qualification for admission to practice
before the Supreme Court; the reason being that such act was a bill of
attainder.
1868. Reichert v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Feb. 20, 1812, authorizing a board of revision to pass on titles already confirmed by other
agents of the government.
1869. The Alicia v. United States, 7 Wall. 571.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act June 30, 1864, purporting to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of prize cases appealed
from the District to the Circuit Court by a prior act, and not disposed
of by the Circuit Courts.
1870. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall..603.
Declared unconstitutional the Legal Tender Acts of 1862-63, in so
far as they made United States notes a legal tender in payment of debts
contracted before the passage of the act.
1870. United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 41.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act March 2, 1867, which
prohibited the sale of petroleum below a certain standard; the court holding that the act was unconstitutional, in that it prohibited trade within
the limits of a state.
1870. Justices of Supreme Court v. United States ex rel. Murray, 9
Wall. 274.
*Declared unconstitutional Act March 3; 1863, providing for the
removal of a judgment in a state court in a case tried by a jury to the
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Circuit Court of the United States for a retrial, as a violation of the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
1871.

Bufington v. Day, II Wall. 113.
Declared unconstitutional that portion of the Income Tax Laws
of 1864, 1865, 1866, and 1867 which imposed a tax upon the salary
of judicial officers of a state.
1872.
United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128.
Declared unconstitutional a provision of the Appropriation Act of
1870 (Act July 12, 1870) which annulled the effect of the President's
pardon on one who participated in the Rebellion.
1873.
United States v.Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 17 Wall. 322.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of the Revenue Acts of 1864
and 1866 which laid a tax on interest on bonds issued by the city of
Baltimore, on the ground that the federal government had no right to
levy tax on the instrumentalities of the state.
1876.
United States v. Reese, 92 U. S.214.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act May 13, 1870, providing for the punishment of all who refused to receive and count the
votes of citizens having all of the qualifications of voters, because of their
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
1878.
United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act May 31, 1870, that
one against whom bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, who within
three months prior thereto obtained goods with the intent to defraud,
shall be punished by imprisonment.
1879.
United States v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 82 (Trade-Mark Cases).
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act July 8, 1870, and Act
August 14, 1876, relating to trade marks, on the ground that this matter was not delegated to Congress.
1883.
United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 1 S. Ct. 601.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act April 20, 1861, providing for the punishment of persons conspiring to deprive any other
person of the equal protection of the law, on the ground that no warrant
can be found in the Constitution for its enactment.
1883.
United States v. Stanley, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18.
Declared unconstitutional the first and second sections of Civil
Rights Act March 1, 1875, punishing those who denied equal accommodations at inns, theaters, trains, etc., because of previous condition of
servitude, as not being authorized by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments, which only prohibit the states from passing such laws.
1886.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act June 22, 1874, which
authorized a United States court in revenue cases to require the defendant
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or claimant to produce in court his private books and papers, as being
repugnant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
1888. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 8 S. Ct. 1301.
Declared unconstitutional section 1064, R. S. D. C., in so far as
they deny the right to a jury trial to one charged with a criminal offense.
This decision established the right to trial by jury in police court cases
in the District.
1892. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195.
Declared unconstitutional Rev. St. §860, Interstate Commerce Act,
as limiting the provisions of the Constitution, which declare that a person shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.
1893. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312,
13 S. Ct. 622.
Declared unconstitutional the provisions of Act Aug. 11, 1888,
for stipulating that in estimating the sum to be paid by the United States
for a lot and dam, the franchise of the corporation to take tolls shall not
be considered or estimated. The court holds that what is just compensation for private property taken for public use is a judicial and not a
legislative question.
1895. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 S.
Ct. 673.
Declared unconstitutional the Income Tax Act of 1894 as a direct
tax.
1896. Wong Wing u. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977.
Declared unconstitutional that portion of Act May 5, 1892 (Chinese Exclusion Act), which provided that one adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to remain in the United States shall be imprisoned at hard
labor and thereafter removed from the United States.
1899. Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 19 S. Ct. 574.
Declared unconstitutional so much of Act March 3, 1875, as provided that the judgment of conviction against the principal in the crime
of embezzlement or larceny of property of the United States shall be
evidence, in the prosecution against a receiver thereof, that the property
Was embezzled or stolen, on the ground that it was in violation of the
Sixth Amendment, providing that an accused shall be confronted with
the witnesses against him.
1901. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 21 S. Ct. 648.
Declared unconstitutional the provision of Internal Revenue Act
June 13, 1898, providing for stamp tax on foreign bills of lading, on
the ground that the tax was in effect a tax on the articles included in the
bill of lading, and therefore a tax on exports prohibited by article 1,
section 9, of the Constitution.
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1903. James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 23 S. Ct. 678.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act May 31, 1870, providing for punishment of individuals who, by means of bribery, prevent
persons to whom the right of suffrage is granted by the Fifteenth Amendment, from exercising that right, on the ground that the provisions of
the amendment apply to abridgments of the right by the United States,
or by any state, and not to acts of individuals.
1905. InreHeff, 197 U.S. 488,25S. Ct. 506.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Jan. 30, 1897, relating
to sale of liquor within a state to an Indian to whom an allotment of
land had been made and the privileges of citizenship extended, as an
improper exercise of the power to regulate commerce "with the Indian
tribes."
1905. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516, 25 S. Ct. 514.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act June 6, 1900, providing that, in trials for misdemeanors in Alaska, six jurors should constitute a legal jury, on the ground that it was repugnant to the Sixth
Amendment.
1906. Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 6.
Declared unconstitutional provision of Act (R. S. §§1977, 5508)
making it an offense against the United States for private individuals
to compel negro citizens, by intimidation and force, to desist from performing their contracts of employment, as beyond the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
1908. Howard v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 463, 28 S.
Ct. 141.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Employers' Liability Act
June 11, 1906, extending its effect to all employees of agencies engaged
in interstate commerce, on the ground that it regulated intrastate as well
as interstate commerce in such a way that the provisions could not be
separated.
1908. Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,28 S. Ct. 277.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act June 1, 1898, making
it a criminal offense against the United States for an agent or officer of an
interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of his membership in
a labor organization, as-an invasion of the right of personal liberty and
of property, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
1909. Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 29 S. Ct. 470.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Feb. 20, 1907, prescribing criminal punishment for the keeping, maintaining, supporting,
or harboring of alien women for the purpose of prostitution, as beyond
the powers delegated to Congress by the states.
1909. United States v. Evans, 213 U. S. 297, 29 S. Ct. 507.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of District Columbia Code,
§935, providing that in criminal prosecution the United States or the
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District shall have the same right of appeal as is given to defendant with
the further proviso that, if on appeal error should be found, a verdict in
favor of the defendant should not be set aside. The court holds that
this presents only a moot question, the decision of which is not a judicial function.
1911.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act March 1, 1907,
attempting to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims, and by
appeal upon. the Supreme Court, of suits against the United States to be
brought by Cherokee Indians to determine the validity of certain acts
of Congress.
1911. Coylev. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 31 S. Ct. 688.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act June 16, 1916, admitting Oklahoma to the Union, which provided that the state capital
should not be changed from Guthrie prior to 1913, on the ground that,
although accepted by an irrevocable ordinance, it ceased to be a valid
limitation upon the power of the state after its admission.
1913. Butts v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 230 U. S. 126, 33
S. Ct. 964.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Civil Rights Act March 1,
1875, denying the validity of their application to only the District of
Columbia and places within the jurisdiction of the United States, as the
sea, as not within the intent of Congress.
1915.
United States u. Hvoslef, 237 U. S. 1, 35 S. Ct. 459.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Revenue Act June 13,
1898, for stamp tax on charter parties for carriage from state ports to
foreign ports, as a violation of the Constitution (article 1, §9), providing that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any state.
1915. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S.
19, 35 S. Ct. 496.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Revenue Act June 13,
1898, imposing a stamp tax upon policies insuring cargoes against marine risks, as being in substance a tax upon exports, contrary to Const.,
art. 1, §9.
1918. Hammeru. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529.
Declared unconstitutional the first Child Labor Act, Act Sept. 1,
1916, as an invalid attempt by Congress, acting under its power to regulate commerce; to control, to the practical exclusion of the states, all
manufacture of articles intended for interstate shipment.
1920. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Revenue Act Sept. 8, 1916,
providing that stock dividends shall be considered income; Congress having no power within the Sixteenth Amendment, to define income, but
simply to tax it without regard to apportionment according to the population.
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1920. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Act Oct. 6, 1917, which
extended to claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's
Compensation Law of any state, as authorizing and sanctioning action
by the states in prescribing and enforcing rights, obligations, liabilities,
and remedies designed to provide compensation for injuries to employees
engaged in maritime work, and therefore beyond the power of Congress,
which cannot delegate to the states the power given it by Const., art. 3,
§2, to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime
jurisdiction.
1920. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550.
Declared unconstitutional a provision of Act Feb. 24, 19 19, so far
as it imposes a tax upon the income of judges of the courts of the United
States, including their salaries, as a violation of Const., art. 3, § 1, providing that the compensation of judges shall not be diminished during
their term of office.
1921.
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 S.
Ct. 298.
Declared unconstitutional a provision of Act Oct. 22, 1919, making it unlawful to make any unjust or unreasonable charge in dealing
in necessaries, because it fixes no ascertainable standard of guilt, and does
not adequately inform those accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
1921.
Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of Corrupt Practices Act June
25, 1910, so far as it applies to party primaries or conventions.
1922. United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433, 42 S. Ct. 368.
Declared unconstitutional a provision of Act March 23, 1906,
which permitted punishment for an infamous crime to be imposed after
prosecution instituted by information, and not by indictment, as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
1922. Bailey v. Drexel FurnitureCo., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of second Child Labor Act,
Act Feb. 24, 1919, on the ground that it was manifestly not a tax law,
as it purported to be, but was intended to regulate the employment of
children, which is a matter reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment.
1922. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of the Futures Trading Act
Aug. 24, 1921, as beyond the powers conferred upon Congress by the
commerce clause of the Constitution.
1923. Adkins v. Children's Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261
U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394.
Declared unconstitutional Minimum Wage Act Sept. 19, 1918, as
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an arbitrary interference with freedom of contract, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
1923. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S.
Ct. 445.
Declared a portion of the Public Utility Act for the District of
Columbia, Act March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 936, 974, invalid as conferring
legislative or administrative power on Supreme Court.
1926. Truslerv. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46 S. Ct. 165.
Declared the Future Trading Act of Aug. 24, 1921, unconstitutional as imposing a penalty instead of tax.
1926. Myersv.U.S.,272 U.S.52,47S. Ct. 21.
Declared Act July 12, 1876, requiring consent of Senate to removal
by President of postmasters of certain classes, invalid under Const., art.
2, under which President has sole power of removal.
1928. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 S. Ct. 353.
Declared Revenue Act June 2, 1924, §319, in so far as it imposes
tax on gift made while act was pending invalid as denying due process
of law.
1935. PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241.
Declared sections of N. R. A. authorizing President to prohibit
transportation in interstate commerce of surplus oil, an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.
1935. RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 55
S. Ct. 758.
Declared Railroad Retirement Act invalid as not a reasonable regulation of interstate commerce.
1935. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837.
Declared National Recovery Act invalid as delegation of legislative
power to President, and as going beyond power to regulate interstate
commerce.
1935. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555,
55 S. Ct. 854.
Declared Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act (Bankruptcy Act
§75 (s), 11 U. S. C. A. §203 (s), invalid as depriving mortgagees of
property rights without compensation.
1936. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312.
Declared unconstitutional provisions of A. A. A. as beyond the
delegated powers of Congress and limiting the general welfare clause to
the power to tax and not the power to legislate generally.
1936. Carter v. CarterCoal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855.
Declared Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional as
to labor provisions which only indirectly affect interstate commerce.

AS IT WAS IN THE BEGINNING
By J. W. KELLEY of the Denver Bar
T IS difficult to find any person in these days who cannot
explain exactly what the Constitution of the United
States means. Lawyers, editors, preachers, politicians all
modestly admit their ability to discern the precise meaning of
its every phrase. Not in a generation has any public man confessed he was in any doubt about its exact significance. All
those who profess to so clearly fathom its meaning fortify
their opinions, in contradicting others equally positive, by
reference to what those who lived in the days when the Constitution was being formed and adopted, and first amended, said
it meant.

It is disconcerting to the student of the Constitution to
find that the men who stood nearest to the desk on which the
final draft was written were immediately at variance over its
meaning, and especially the extent of the powers granted the
Executive by that great instrument. To Thomas Jefferson,
then in France, was submitted a draft of the finished work.
He professed to find at once an omission so vital that it was
necessary to pass ten amendments, suggested by Jefferson, to
correct the error into which the framers had fallen. Afterward
President Jefferson was for two terms the Chief Executive
under the completed instrument. He should be excellent
authority on the extent of the executive power under the Constitution; but he proved not to be. When the Louisiana Purchase was completed he wrote:
"The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign
territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our own. The
executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the
good of the country has done an act beyond the Constitution."

This naive confession by Jefferson of the void character
of his own acts was written only fifteen years after the Constitution was adopted. The Federalists had assailed Jefferson
and threatened to impeach him for what they said was a flagrant violation of the fundamental law in paying 15 million
dollars to France for the Louisiana Purchase. The famous
X. Y. Z. disclosures by John Marshall were still fresh in the
public mind and it was believed an act of indemnity by Congress would be necessary to protect the President.
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Then Chief Justice John Marshall, twenty years later, in
deciding the case of The American Insurance Company, et al.
vs. David Canter, 1st Peters 511 (involving our right to acquire Florida in 1819), hit upon a meaning that Jefferson and
the outraged leaders of Marshall's own party had failed to
perceive. He declared:
"The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the
Union the powers of making war and of making treaties: consequently
that government possesses the power of acquiring territory either by
conquest or by treaty."

When such high authorities disagree, who shall decide?
Like the words of the ancient oracle the utterances of the
weird sisters in Macbeth-not forgetting the scriptures-the
precise meanings of the provisions of the great "Layman's
Document" seem to be subject to as many interpretations as
there are different minds to examine them.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
1140 North Dearborn St.
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Chicago, Illinois.-The American Bar Association announced today that John W. Guider of Washington, D. C., has been reappointed
by President Arthur T. Vanderbilt as Chairman of the association's
Standing Committee on Communications. Mr. Guider has been a consistently active member of this committee for several years, and chairman
since 1933.
This committee has been one of the hardest working groups in the
association. Since the first committee on the subject was appointed in
1929, its annual reports have been among the most thorough and illuminating ever submitted to the association. During the past year, this
committee has started on an ambitious program in original research in
the laws dealing with the electrical transmission of intelligence. Other
regular features in the work of this committee have included cooperation
with congressional groups dealing with legislation in this field, and representing the association at international conferenGes involving governmental regulation of radio, telegraph, and related businesses.
The other members of the committee are Edwin M. Borchard,
member of the faculty of Yale Law School, an outstanding student of
international law, who has held numerous public positions of responsibility; Clyde L. Hester, of Jackson, Mississippi; Milford Springer, member of the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D. C.;

and Bethuel M. Webster, of New York City.
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WHERE HAVE WE HEARD SOMETHING LIKE THIS, BEFORE?
From Chicago Bar Association Bulletin (being songs from the
show given at its annual holiday dinner, December, 1936).
HOW WE RUN THE PAROLE BOARD
(Air: Tramp, Tramp, Tramp)
Down in Joliet the boys
Always make a lot of noise
While the sentence keeps their racket on (he blink;
For they feel it isn't fair,
That they cannot get a share
Of the swag that's lifted while they're in the clink.
Chorus:
So we let the boys go marching,
Marching out upon Parole;
We release a lousy horde,
That's the way we run the Board.
(Ironically) It perhaps may save an erring brother's soul.
CONVICT'S SONG--WHO'S AFRAID TO BREAK PAROLE?
(Tune: "Big Bad Wolf")
We jolly convicts here
Restrictions when he's free
Enjoy the Chairman's beer,
Restrict no parolee,
We laugh and shout,
It cramps no style.
We'll soon be out,
To be in a file
Of that we have no fear;
And so we sing, sing we
Chorus:
Who's afraid to break parole, break parole, break parole,
Who's afraid to break parole, Certainly not me.
NEVADA INSISTS THAT THE LAWYERS, DO THE
SOLICITING
OMAR E. GARWOOD

Nevada Compiled Laws 1929, Section 621, is substantially as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons within the State of

Nevada, unless he or they be an attorney at law, licensed to practice law
by virtue of the laws of the State of Nevada, to solicit, influence or procure any person within this state to employ, hire or retain any attorney
at law within this state for any legal services.-Nevada Compiled Laws
1929, Sec. 621.
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS-In re: Interrogatoriesof the Senate Concerning the Constitutionality of House Bill No. 379-No. 14149PerCuriam.
Interrogatory 1. Does House Bill No. 379 and particularly Section 20 thereof conflict with Section 2 (a) of Amendment No. 4 to the
Constitution, "The Old Age Pension Amendment"?
The answer is No.
BONDS - TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY - ACCELERATION OF MATURITY
DATE OF BOND-The Union Deposit Co. et al. vs. Talbot-No.
13899-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Geo. F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The District Court entered judgment for over $2,600
against the defendant Union Deposit Company and also the defendant
Union Trust Company. That judgment is brought to the Supreme
Court by both companies for review. The sole question is one concerning the acceleration of the maturity date of the bond, which was dated
August 8, 1927, and which was to be paid for in ten annual installments
of $180 each.
Among the terms and provisions incorporated in the
bond was the following: "When advance payments are made and with
interest computed thereon at 6% per annum, compounded annually,
amount to $2,500 before the maturity of the bond, then this bond, at
the option of the owner, shall become immediately due and payable, or
interest in cash, at 6% per annum, will be paid annually thereafter to the
registered owner, his heirs or assigns, until maturity."
Results of calculations by experts for both plaintiff and defendant varied as to the maturity date. Defendants contend the action was prematurely brought.
HELD: 1. The error that crept into the calculations represented
by plaintiff's expert is the inclusion of those sums which constitute the
payments necessary to make up the first $1 80 annual payment, which
should have been paid August 8, 1927, the date of the bond. The payments made on August 8th, September 1st, September 3rd, November
ist, and December 3, 1927, aggregating $179.79, were obviously not
advance payments within the meaning of any provisions of the bond.
2. As to the defendant Union Trust Company's contention that
the District Court erred in entering judgment against it for the full
amount of the supposed liability of the defendant Union Deposit Company, if there is a liability on the part of the latter, it is because of the
direct promise to pay the bond. The trust company, however, can be
held liable only in connection with its capacity as trustee.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Young dissents.
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DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS-ATTORNEY'S EMPLOYMENT INCONSISTENT WITH DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICE--State of Colorado vs.
Nolon-No. 14019-Decided April 5, 1937-Original Proceeding in Disbarment-Respondent Suspended.
FACTS: Nolon, a member of the Colorado Bar, was elected to the
office of State Senator for the Thirtieth and Thirty-first General Assemblies; that in the Thirtieth Assembly he became chairman of the standing insurance committee of the Senate, and of an interim committee to
act between the adjournment of the Thirtieth and the incoming Thirtyfirst assemblies. The interim committee, with Nolon as chairman, was
appointed to carry on between the sessions and make a thorough and
detailed investigation of any and all alleged unlawful, fraudulent, improper or unauthorized practices, transactions or business of any insurance company. Soon after the adjournment of the Thirtieth Assembly,
five companies which were subject to investigation by the committee
severally retained and paid Nolon to act as their attorney. Nolon at the
time was aware of the fact that the companies knew when they retained
him that he was chairman of the interim committee charged with investigation of the respective companies. None of the five companies were
examined by the interim committee.
HELD:
1. A State Senator who is a licensed attorney is not disqualified from practicing law during his term of office, but he is not
absolved from the requirement of observing the proprieties of his profession.
2.
The court does not'countenance the conduct of an attorney in
accepting tendered professioanal employment which should have been
instinctively rejected by the most unwary of attorneys.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Mr.. Justice Bouck and Mr.
Justice Knous not participating.

SURETIES-WILFUL MISAPPLICATION OF FUNDS-INTENT-BONDS
-FRAUD-The Mortgage Broker Company vs. Mills et al.-No.
13878-Decided April 5, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon.
Henley A. Calvert, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Reference will be made to the plaintiff in error as plaintiff and defendants in error as defendants, or Mills, and surety or bonding company. Plaintiff sought to recover approximately $4,000 'from
Mills, a former secretary-treasurer of the company, and the surety on
his bonds. Plaintiff's business is that of making loans. Mills became
the sole managing agent of the company, because he was called upon to
act alone.
Plaintiff complains that Mills loaned money in greater
amounts than the loan applications called for. The bond is in the form
of the usual fidelity bond, and provides for payment of any direct loss
caused by the employee named therein "through larceny, theft, embezzlement, forgery, misappropriation, wrongful abstraction, willful misap-
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plication, or any other act or fraud or dishonesty * * *." There is not

the slightest reflection upon the personal integrity of Mills.
HELD:
1. The words "wrongful abstraction," and "willful
misapplication" followed by "or any other act of fraud or dishonesty"
in a bond, are construed to indicate or denote acts of fraud or dishonesty.
2. Before the terms used in the bond could have application as the
basis of liability on the part of a surety, it first must be established that
Mills converted the money or property to his own use or benefit, intending thereby to defraud his company.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
INSURANCE-COUNTIES-FIDELITY BONDS-STATUTE OF FRAUDSSTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CAUSES OF ACTION-ACCRUAL OF

-Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company vs. The Board
of County Commissioners of Adams County, Colorado--No.
13886-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Adams
County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action brought by the board, defendant in error, against
the bonding company, plaintiff in error, to recover on a fidelity bond.
Judgment was in favor of the county and the bonding company prosecutes error. Shearston was appointed to the office of Deputy County
Treasurer and Deputy Public Trustee for the county on April 6, 1923.
The bond was made to indemnify the county for any defalcations
caused by Shearston. The premiums on this bond were paid regularly
each year. Beginning in June, 1928, and continuing until February,
1933, Shearston embezzled from the County Treasurer's office the total
sum of $29,488.37. The lower court allowed the maximum penalty
of the bond of $3,000 to be recovered for each of the five years, making
a total of $15,000. The bonding company assigns error on the following: (1) That it was surety on only one continuing bond and its maximum liability for the entire period involved was $3,000. (2) Statute
of frauds. (3) Bonds were for a two-year period. (4) Recovery barred
by the statute of limitations. HELD: 1. "A renewal of a fidelity policy or bond constitutes a
separate and distinct contract for the period of time covered by such
renewal, unless it appears to be the intention of the parties. as evidenced
by the provisions thereof, that such policy or bond and the renewal
thereof shall constitute one continuous contract."
2. The memorandum which the statute of fraud requires was met
where the company sent notices of the premium due, identifying the
contract, the dates between which the premium operated making the
contract effective and subscribed to by an agent whose authority was not
questioned.
3. As to the contention that the contracts were for two-year
periods: there is no merit in this contention; and the trial court properly found that the contracts were for each year.
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4. The three-year statute of limitations may not be invoked
against the State, and even though the State was not a party to this
action, it is unquestionably true that part of the money stolen belonged
to the State.
5. The causes of action do not accrue until the defalcations become known, which was within the three-year period in this case, and
therefore the statute of limitations would not bar a recovery.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Chief
Justice Burke concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EVIDENCE OF AN INJURY, TIME OFTHE COMPLAINT-CAUSES OF ACTION-HERNIA-EVIDENCE
-- SUPREME COURT-Hallack and Howard Lumber Company et

al. vs. Bagly et al.-No. 14094-Decided April 19, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act in
which plaintiffs in error are seeking to reverse a judgment of the lower
court which affirmed an award of compensation by the Industrial Commission to the defendant in error, Bagly. Bagly was injured on October
28, 1935, while working in the shop of the lumber company, by being
struck in the groin by a board. It appears that Bagly had had abdominal trouble before which resulted in an operation for hernia in 1930.
His contention here is that his being struck by the board caused a new
hernia slightly below where the old one had been. He received medical
attention the same day that he was injured; no hernia was found, lut
he did have a definite tenderness over the left groin. He continued to
have pain and it was subsequently discovered that he did have hernia.
The award is being attacked because there was no external evidence of
the rupture on the same day that the accident happened, but the claimant
testified that the injury developed into a rupture. Then the question
naturally arises-was the commission justified in making the inference
that the accident caused the hernia?
HELD: 1. The outward evidences of an injury need not become
immediately apparent. It is sufficient if the injury complained of was
set in motion or caused by the accidental injury becoming apparent in a
reasonable time.
2. If the facts established are sufficient to cover two causes of
action, the court might so treat the complaint. Therefore, the contention
of the plaintiffs in error that, "because the Attorney General argued in
his brief that the injury would be compensable because of an accident
arising out of claimant's employment, it constitutes an abandonment of
the hernia as a basis for compensation," is erroneous.
3. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act the Supreme Court
is precluded from disturbing findings based upon sufficient evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
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DENVER LAWYERS APPOINTED
Robert E. More and John 0. Rames, of the Denver bar, have been
appointed to represent the State of Colorado as members of the Standing
Committee on State Legislation of the American Bar Association.
The principal function of this committee is to promote the views
of the association with reference to legislation pending and proposed in
the various states, and especially to sponsor Uniform State Laws drafted
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